Frohmann (PDF) uses the ethical frameworks of Froelich and Hauptman as foils for his own de-centred ethics (as in the sense of “not self–centred”). At first blush it may appear that Froelich and Hauptman has very little in common, but Frohmann shows that these two theories are “exemplars” of a self–centred ethics.    Froelich’s self is tripartite and encounters ethical dilemmas dialectically as irresolvable antagonism.

The antagonisms are generative of a self that is, at best, able to recognize the value of the conflicts but cannot overcome them. An incurable malaise results, and the virtuous person accepts this.    Hauptman, on the other hand, argues that principled thinking and following “traditional values” will bind a community and create courageous people who are willing to act.    Frohmann argues that common to both theories are “important structural characteristics of a self–centered information ethics.” Frohmann suggests that, for Froelich and Hauptman, underpinning the self are ethical “conflicts and tensions”; should these be resolved “the basis of moral action is undermined.” It would seem that Frohmann is interpreting Froelich and Hauptman in such a way that without ethical conflict, the self–itself disappears. The “basis of moral action” is, if we accept that the theories are self-centred, surely nothing else than Froelich’s tripartite self and Hauptman’s courageous self. This result is stunning and odd. Surely Froelich and Hauptman would want to avoid this result, and any charitable reading would suggest that for Froelich and Hauptman the self is, in the Enlightenment tradition, transcendental. As transcendental selves, everything changes for Frohmann’s analysis; no longer is “the consciousness of the epistemological subject…a condition of the possibility of information.” As transcendental selves what is information? Could it still be “semantic content communicated between persons”?    What if the transcendental selves belonged to Kant’s Kingdom of Ends, would these ends involve material items (or are they mere means)?    I do not have these answers, but there is still more to ruminate on before we dismiss self-centred ethics all–together. Further, (if I may be so bold) I have previously tried to argue (in a manifestly unpublished paper) that you can still maintain a semantic theory of information while incorporating Shannon’s views on the reduction of entropy. Cohen and Meskin (2006) have developed a counterfactual theory of information, and building on this I have suggested that if the network (in Castell’s sense) is counterfactually rich with conflicting syntactic relationships, it is meaning (cashed out in terms of power) that is able to reduce the entropy of the system by closing off alternative interpretations.    Thus, communication is still about semantic transfer, however, some alternative voices (those lacking the necessary power) are shut out of the generative apparatus. In this way, technology shapes the mere possibility of semantic transfer. Foucault’s regimes of truth, the network of writing, the documentary practices, are the apparatuses that create meaning by eliminating alternative understandings (through their restrictive practices); entropy is reduced in the network because some voices do not come to fruition, and thus we are back at Shannon’s syntactic theory of information.    Or, working backwards, the “system of differentiations” (Foucault) that results are determined by totalizing and individualizing power, but are elaborated through a system of communication. To speak directly to Frohmann’s theory, I disagree that meaning is established by “making contact” and “arousing affect”, and without meaning, there is no subjectivity.
References
Cohen, J., & Meskin, A.    (2006, September).    An objective counterfactual theory of information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(3), 333-352.